The Cedarville Situation: An Unoriginal Proposal
Pilate asks the rhetorical, cynical question of Jesus (John 18:38), "What is truth?" It is not coincidental that the question appears in John's gospel only, for only in John's gospel is the answer provided in a remarkably clear way.
The answer as Jesus (through the pen of John) would have us see it is not one to which philosophers would necessarily ascribe. Truth for the philosopher was something that was changeless, something that was not mere appearance or illusion, or something that corresponds with the facts. Each of these notions contains helpful elements, and yet they all remain in the realm of principle.
Jesus identified truth as a Person, namely, Himself: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (Jn 14:6). In saying that He was claiming more than simply being truth personified. He was saying that He in His essence was Truth in its essence.
(By the way, note that John makes the same radical break with philosophy in his identification of Jesus as the divine Logos, the Word. The Greeks taught the Logos as the rational principle of the cosmos. John teaches the Logos as a Person, a divine Person: Jesus Christ.)
The gist of my point is this: in its ultimate essence truth is not a thing. It is not merely a property, or attribute of reality. Truth is a Person: Jesus Christ.
This definition solves and creates some problems. It solves the problem brought on by the Correspondence Theory, in that reality is no longer posited as ultimate. It creates problems, as noted by Darby, in that our use of the word "truth" can signify vastly different things. We can be speaking of Ultimate Truth, as in "Jesus Christ is God", or a more garden-variety truth such as "I am writing this post on Sunday" or "The earth is the third planet from the sun."
The distinction above is precisely what is ameliorated in the foolish dictum "All truth is God's truth." Ignoring this distinction is part of what causes so many problems in the truth and certainty debate.
I wonder if perhaps it would be helpful to propose a definition of truth (truth of the former kind, not the latter) like this: "Truth is that which adequately corresponds to the revealed Person, words, or works of God." This statement has the advantage of anchoring the idea of Truth where it belongs. It has the disadvantage of being a notion that is totally foolish to the secularist.
Hmmm. Maybe that's not such a bad idea: "But the natural man does not accept the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him..." 1 Co. 2:14, NASB.
